

Language (De) Territorialization: Language Attitudes of Consent and Acquiescence among Miami Cuban

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1. Introduction

By observing who speaks what language variety, in what social domain, with whom, and for what purpose, sociolinguists have obtained deep insights into power and social structures within speech communities. Language varieties are automatically associated with the social groups that use their varieties. Therefore, targeting language varieties can be an indirect mechanism to promote policies which affect specific social groups, through the means of language planning or engineering¹.

Social institutions depend on the predictability of day-to-day routines which should run effortlessly. In everyday language, predictability is a matter of what variety a given speaker should select in different domains, with whom, etc. However, predictability does not *naturally happen* but it is *made to happen* (Giddens 1987: 11). For language predictability to work efficiently, there must be an *unconscious contract* regulating the use of varieties within the speech community. Such contract constitutes a tacit language policy at work, invisible until violated. This article will discuss this situation in a speech community (South Florida), where a nation-state language (English) is in contact with a minority language (Spanish), and the use of the latter is altering language predictability within the speech community. We will gain access to the tacit language policy through rationalizations verbalized by members of this community. Most of these rationalizations are grounded on the concept of language (de) territorialization.

2. Language (de)territorialization

The political construct of the nation-state predates the emergence of national languages², and it took quite an effort to *create the later* (see Ruzza 2002; Wright 2004). They National languages needed to be engineered because the nation-state requires *legibility* (Scott 1998: 183), i.e., simplifications and standardizations that create visible units (villages, people, trees, languages, dialects, etc.), so they can be surveilled (observed, counted, monitored, reorganized, manipulated). "Of all state simplifications," Scott claims, "the imposition of a single, official language may be the most powerful [...] precondition of many other simplifications"; furthermore, national languages are part and parcel of "[a] cultural project [...] lurked behind the linguistic centralization" (Scott 1998: 72).

¹ In this paper, *language planning* and *language engineering* are used as synonyms. They refer to any efforts towards the promotion or implementation of a *language policy*. The later designates a given arrangement, or current status quo, ongoing in a speech community.

² I will us *national language* to refer to the language that is identified with a nation-state regardless its Constitutional status.

As part of that nation's cultural project, national languages acquire several privileges over other varieties in contact: they are promoted as national symbols, paradoxically, they become depoliticized, or more precisely, their politicization becomes invisible, vis-à-vis other varieties. In this context, any act interpreted as resistance to national languages or promotion of other varieties could be considered an antipatriotic act that encourages national disunity (Tollefson 1996: 12). To the extent that such ideological propositions become *natural* and pervasive, "the dominant group has established *hegemony*, which is the successful production and reproduction of ideology" (Tollefson 1996: 12).

In order to describe the impact of national languages on competing varieties, I will use the term *(de)territorialization* (Deleuze 1974; Malkki 1992). (De)territorialization designates propositional acts that grant legitimacy to a national, territorialized variety, which results in delegitimizing or deterritorializing another, or vice versa. Such acts are grounded on the ideology of monolingualism³ as promoted in the Western nation-states. This paper will consider the persuasive power of linguistic (de)territorialization as hegemonic ideology.

Linguistic (de)territorialization has at least two recurrent features. One is *invisibility*: (de)territorializing propositional acts are commonsensical, which grants them the appearance of ideological neutrality, i.e., (de)territorializing claims are not perceived as political acts. The second feature is their *deontic nature*, because (de)territorialization draws on a moral discourse of patriotism and reverence to the nation-state.

This paper addresses one effort of language planning pushed forward by a social movement whose goal is the promotion of English monolingualism in the U.S. through a Constitutional amendment that recognizes English as the official language of the United States. My focus, though, is not on the English Only (EO) movement itself, its goals, or arguments per se, but how language (de)territorialization supports the EO's agenda. Through the analysis of the data, I will present and discuss language attitudes and beliefs about English and Spanish as languages in contact among Miami Cubans, illustrating the reproduction of the hegemonic ideology of (de)territorialization.

3. EO in Miami and the State of Florida

Castro, Haun, and Roca (1990: 150) argue that the movement EO was born with a clear anti-Hispanic tone as transpires in articles and speeches by its founder Senator Samuel Hayakawa (e.g., 1992: 100). The anti-ethnic rhetoric and urge for English monolingualism is not new in American public discourse. From Benjamin Franklin (1992 [1753]: 18), to John Jay (Crawford 1992: 32), to Theodor Roosevelt (1992 [1917]: 84), and to current president Donald Trump (Hollywood Reporter 2015), English monolingualism as a feature of patriotism has been a constant talking point. It is conventionally accepted that the modern EO movement started in 1981, when Senator Hayakawa, introduced the first proposition to declare English the official language of the U.S. (Ricento 1996). However, Castro, Haun, and Roca (1990: 150) argue EO was born in South Florida when, in 1980, Dade County passed Ordinance 80-128 declaring that no expenditure of county funds could be used "for the purpose of utilizing any language other than English or promoting any culture other than that of the United States" (Tatalovich 1995: 87). This initial victory culminated on November 8, 1988, when Amendment 11 to the Florida Constitution passed overwhelmingly carrying all seventy-seven counties in Florida (Tatalovich 1995: 101).

Paradoxically, Dade County was ahead of the rest of the country with respect to bilingualism and multiculturalism. In 1963, Dade County had established the first bilingual education program in the U.S. Public School system. Ten years later, the board of commissioners passed a resolution that declared Dade County "a bilingual and bicultural county where Spanish is considered the second official language" (Castro 1992: 183). From 1960 to 1970, the Hispanic population, mostly Cubans, had grown from 5.3% to 23.6%, displacing African Americans as first minority. In addition to demographic growth, by mid 1980s, Hispanics had acquired political visibility in the community. In 1976, the *Miami Herald* became the only major U.S. newspaper to publish a daily edition in Spanish.

³ Homogenizing tendencies within the nation-state's project encompass much more than language. Jon Jay, 1877, in the Federalist Papers, envisions the utopia of an engineered nation: one united people – a people descended from the same ancestors, speaking the same language, professing the same religion, very similar in their manners and costumes (Crawford 1992: 32)

Finally, Hispanics in Miami, and particularly Cubans, were establishing a strong economic niche (Tatalovich 1995: 85). As Didion has observed:

...in the other cities, Spanish was spoken by the people who worked in the car wash and came to trim the trees and cleared the tables in restaurants. In Miami, Spanish was spoken by the people who ate in the restaurants, the people who owned the cars and trees... What was so unusual about Spanish in Miami was not that it was so often spoken but that it was *so often heard*. (Didion 1987: 63 my emphasis)

This infringement of linguistic predictability reached breaking point with a massive migration that arrived in South Florida by 1980. From 1977 to 1981, between 50,000 to 70,000 Haitians had arrived to South Florida by boat, with the numbers reaching a peak in 1980 (Portes and Stepick 1987: 1), and in the same year, from April 15 to October 31, 125,000 Cubans arrived with the Mariel Boatlift. In this context, Dade County's voters passed Ordinance 80-128.

The second concerted effort to support the Spanish language occurred in 1987, when Commissioner Valdés announced his intention to repeal Ordinance 80-128 (Tatalovich 1995: 88). This time EO's response was settle the issue at the state constitutional level. Terry Robins, head of Dade Americans United to Protect the English Language, threatened Mr. Valdés:

If they repeal it, we are going to get another anti-bilingual ordinance on the ballot, and if Jorge [Valdés] doesn't like the 1980 ordinance, he is not going to like the 1988 ordinance, I can guarantee him that [...] It is as if native Americans don't exist in Dade County [...] It is as though the Cuban people of this community are the only ones who contribute to the health and welfare, they are the only ones who have problems, they are the only ones who should be taken care of. Well, we are mad as hell. We are not going to take it anymore. This is the United States of America. (Tatalovich 1995: 89)

Patricia Fulton, activist of Florida English, claimed that residents felt under siege by the increasing number of Hispanics:

We get letters from people in South Florida who are frustrated, who feel they are in a foreign city [...] It's like, whoops, I just stepped off into South America. You stop a person on the street in a Hispanic neighborhood to ask for a direction and they don't speak English. It's unsettling (Tatalovich 1995: 92)

Eileen Trawinski, coordinator of Florida English, made the important connection between language and patriotism: "This is America, and some of the attitudes of people in Dade County have certainly not been American, but very un-American." (Tatalovich 1995: 94)

The opposition barely reacted. A radio commentator invited an EO activist to his radio call-in program expecting a heated debate but "[t]here was practically no reaction. There's an I-don't-give-a-damn attitude. They feel that since this is a Cuban community, they're going to continue speaking Spanish anyway." (Tatalovich 1996: 96). Jon Weber, executive director of English Plus -the grass root organization in support of language diversity and particularly Spanish in the current context- complained about the difficulty of recruiting Hispanic leadership: "It was like talking about the diminution of the ozone layer." With few exceptions, the Cuban reaction was passive, belated, with little grassroots mobilization (Tatalovich 1996: 96). This article thus considers the question of why the response from Miami Cubans was apparently so subdued? I hope to answer this question by the end of this article.

4. The Cuban immigration to South Florida

Some of the roots of the Miami Cubans' reaction (or lack of reaction) point to local narratives waved and circulated for almost sixty years in the local community. They have become a kind of collective memory which might have factored in the formation of language attitudes.

Cuban diaspora to Miami has been described in four stages. The first began when, in 1959, the rebels' army commanded by Fidel Castro overthrew the dictator Fulgencio Batista. This initial stampede lasted until the missile crisis in 1962, when regular flights between Havana and Miami were suspended. This first diaspora brought 248,070 Cubans to the U.S., and received the name of the Golden Exiles, after a 1967 National Geographic's article praising them because they "were successfully building a city in South Florida" (López Morales 2000).

In 1961 Abraham Ribicoff, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare during the Kennedy administration, estimated that three quarters of the faculty of the Universidad de la Habana had migrated to South Florida (Levine and Asis 2000: 5).

This wave was integrated by industrialists, professionals, and people in high managerial positions: 87% were city dwellers, 12.5% had a university degree, 23.5% some college, only 4% had not completed elementary school (López Morales 2000). Cuban exiles received a special treatment from the U.S. government and private organizations. From the federal government they received a special status (parole) that allowed them to work without being legal residents, massive federal support channeled through the *Cuban Refugee Program* (Stepick et al. 2003: 39) in the form of small monthly checks, medical services, retraining courses, and food aid, and a special fund to help the Dade County school district absorb 35.000 new students into the public system (López Morales 2000). Private institutions, such as the *Catholic Relief Services, Protestant Latin American Emergency Committee, Greater Miami Jewish Federation*, added to the task additional, more personalized aid (López Morales 2000). Thus, the myth of the *Golden Exiles* took roots in the imagination of Americans and Cuban exiles, becoming part of a collective memory which laid out foundations for Cubans' positive attitudes and dispositions towards the U.S. government and society.

The second wave took place between 1965 and 1974 and was named the *Freedom Flights*. After the impasse created by the missile crisis, Havana and Washington signed a *Memorandum of Understanding*, and by the end of eight years, a total of 297.318 Cubans had been arrived transported to Miami. The migrant profile differed from the previous wave: 12% were professionals, and 57% were office staff, blue collar workers, and farmworkers (López Morales 2000). However, with the Freedom Flights, an atmosphere of discomfort, even resentment, started growing as the Cuban presence was becoming more salient in South Florida. This atmosphere gave way to the *Miami's Cuban Takeover's narrative*. The phrase *Cuban Takeover* within the perspective of Miami Cuban is currently used to designate the unfounded fears of Anglo Whites to lose power, space, and culture to local Hispanics. For Anglo Whites represents the anxiety created by the perception that Miami is becoming a major global multicultural city where Hispanics have a high visibility. The *Takeover narrative* seems to have been fully developed –by Miami Anglos and African Americans– by the end of the 1970s, signs of Miami's Cubanization were prominent: the bilingual program; the declaration of Dade County as bilingual and bicultural; the daily Miami Herald's edition in Spanish. Finally, by the mid 1970s, the consolidation of a Cuban economic enclave became especially visible. From 1969 to 1982, the number of Cuban firms grew from 3447 to 24.898, and they were not small business but big manufacturing firms (Stepick et al. 2003: 46). Novas (1998: 208-9) points out that by the 1970s, the service sector was controlled by Cubans, and by the year 2000, they were leading the banking business and international trade with Latin America.

In 1980, between April 15 to October 31, 125,000 Cubans arrived in the Florida coasts. This third wave came to be known as the Mariel Boatlift and these incoming migrants were derogatorily named *Marielitos*. Their mean age was 30, which indicates that this was the first massive import of *Cuba's New Man*. They were the product of the revolution, educated by and integrated in the institutions of the socialist system, although in quiet dissent. In an attempt to save face, Castro declared that the majority were the scum of the revolutionary society and, to prove his point, forced criminals out the jails, and mentally ill interns out of asylums, and sent them with the boatlift. The chaos created by the sudden massive relocation of Cubans and Haitians, plus the bad press, generated a negative reaction in the public opinion. Cubans who had arrived before Mariel, afraid of seeing their *Golden Exiles'* image tarnished, kept distance and discriminate against Marielitos. Some of them commented that they felt more discriminated by the *old Cubans* than by the Anglos (López Morales 2000). Thus, a new narrative took shape out of this internal division: *the Old and New Cubans*.

The fourth wave began after 1989 with the collapse of communism and the tightening of the embargo in 1992 and continues into the present. It includes the *Balseros* (i.e., rafters) who left the island on the most precarious artifacts that could float, plus the beneficiaries of a special visa lottery system implemented by the U.S. and Cuban governments in 1994. Born in the Castro regime, there was a predominance of urban blue-collar workers, followed by young professionals and farmworkers (Pew Research Center 2006).

In summary, to understand Cuban Americans' attitudes towards the English language and the U.S. government, we need to keep in mind the narratives that circulate within the diverse South Florida community: The golden exiles narrative started in the '60s, emphasizes a positive context of reception – special government treatment, the idealization of the U.S. as land of freedom and opportunities: living the American dream in Miami versus the economic hardships and political oppression under the communist regime. The narrative of *Miami's Cuban Takeover* was born within the Anglo and Black local communities. It channels the resentment for the Cubanization of Miami, and the privileged treatment of the federal authorities. Finally, *The Old and New Cubans'* narrative reveals internal fissures within the community.

5. Demographic characteristics

Cuban Americans are the third largest Hispanic minority after Mexicans and Puerto Ricans respectively. In 2013, there were 1986 millions of Cubans in the U.S. Since 1980, Cubans have more than doubled from 822.000 to approximately 2 million (Lopez, G. 2015), and much of the growth has come from U.S. born (Lopez and Krogstad 2014). Still, they are mainly a foreign-born community. The median age of Cubans is 40 (Lopez, G. 2015).

Cubans are the most geographically concentrated of the 14 largest Hispanic groups in the U.S.: 78% live in the south, and 68% in Florida. As for educational attainment, 25% of Cubans, ages 25 and older, have obtained at least a bachelor's degree, compared to U.S. Hispanics (14%) and U.S. population overall (30%). The median annual personal income for Cubans ages 16 and older was \$25.000 in 2012 – greater than the median earnings for all U.S. Hispanics (\$21.900), but lower than the median earning for the U.S. population (\$30.000) (Lopez, G. 2015). The number of Cubans living in poverty (20%) is higher than the share for the U.S. population (16%) but lower than the rate for all U.S. Hispanics (25%) (Lopez, G. 2015). Homeownership is an important feature as a salient indicator of the achievement of the so-called American dream. In this respect, 55% of Cubans own a house, a rate higher than that of all Hispanics in the U.S., but lower than the U.S. population as a whole: 45% and 64% respectively. Overall, Cuban Americans are older, mainly immigrants, wealthier, more educated, more geographically concentrated, and more likely to achieve the American dream than the rest of the Hispanic population.

When questioned about what term they use to describe themselves, 63% say Cuban, 19% American and 11% Hispanic or Latino. This indicates that the majority of the Cuban American population holds a positive attitude towards their Cuban origin. As for perception of integration in the U.S. society, when questioned whether or not they thought of themselves as a typical American or very different, 55% of Cuban adults choose typical American versus 37% who feel very different. Thus, the majority feels comfortably integrated in the social fabric of the U.S., perceive themselves as very similar to mainstream Americans and pay no attention to the hyphen that separates Cuban-American. However, mainstream American Floridians perceive themselves as very different from Cubans and Hispanics in general (see section 2 above). In consequence, it is possible to read an effect of similarity attraction⁴ affecting the self-perceptions of the 55% who feel very similar to Americans.

The 2006 *National Survey of Latinos* asked participants whether they consider the U.S. or their country of origin to be their real homeland. More than half of Cubans (52%) considered the U.S. their real homeland (Pew Research Center 2006). Cubans are also more likely than other Hispanics to identify themselves as white when asked about race: 86% of Cubans said they were white compared with 60% Mexicans, 53% among Central and South Americans, and 50% among Puerto Ricans. Only 8% chose some other race, whereas 30% or more of Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, and other Hispanics selected that category. The report also observes that Latinos who identify themselves as white, have higher levels of education and income than those who chose another race (Pew Research Center 2006). Therefore, they perceive race as an indicator of belonging, and whiteness as a measure of perceived inclusion. If that is the case, then self-inclusion in the category of *white* is an index of distance from mainstream American culture, possibly biased by similarity attraction.

In terms of political affiliation, Cuban Americans are conservative. This is barely surprising since they have fled a communist regime, many in horrible conditions. For years, they have supported Republican candidates and policies. However, this reality seems to be changing with the arrivals after 1990 (Krogstad 2016).

⁴ The similarity attraction theory claims that people are attracted to those whom they perceive as having similar beliefs, values, and attitudes.

Compared to other Latinos, Cuban Americans tend to have a more positive view of the U.S. federal government, the country and the Anglos, than do other Hispanics: 64% of Cubans said they trusted the government in Washington to do what is right just about always or most of the time (Pew Research Center 2006). It is safe to say that the positive context of reception and negative departure play a role on that disposition.

From the linguistic point of view, 13% are English dominant. Half of the Cuban adults (51%) consider themselves Spanish dominant, and 36% bilinguals. The majority of Cubans (60%) ages 5 or older speak English proficiently, 40% less than well. A vast majority of Cubans (79%) use Spanish at home, slightly higher than the number for all Hispanics ages 5 or older (73%) (G. Lopez 2015). When faced with the issue whether or not Spanish is an important part of Latino culture and identity, 95% of Hispanics consider it important for the future generations to speak the language. However, 71% think that it is not necessary to speak Spanish to be considered Latino, compared with 28% that say the opposite. When the place of birth is taken into account, a surprising 58% of foreign born say that Spanish is not a necessary component of Latino identity, as do 87% of U.S. born (M. Lopez 2016).

6. Research methodology: data, participants, and instrumentation

The data presented in this paper comes from oral interviews collected in the Miami-Dade metropolitan area in the year 2000. For data collection, I used the snow-ball technique, i.e., relying on few initial facilitators, long-time community residents, who provide access to new participants within their social networks. I made them aware of the need of a diversified sample by reaching to people from different social strata, social networks (work, church, neighbors, communities of practice, etc.), occupations, and periods of immigration.

I interviewed 68 volunteers: fifty-four (79.4%) born in Cuba and fourteen (20.6%) in the U.S. At the time of the interview, all were at least 18 years old, with an average age of 40; forty-three (63.2%) were women and twenty-five (36.8%) men. The overall mean of schooling was 15 years. For occupations, I used a scale from zero (out of the labor market) to four (professionals and business owners). The highest concentration occurred in category three (administrative workers) although the overall mean was 2.1.⁵ For those born in Cuba, the average age of arrival in the U.S. was fourteen, and foreign born had a mean 25 years of residence in the U.S. They were further classified according to their period of arrival – see Author (2006) for a more complete description of the sample.

To conduct the oral interviews, I used a semi-structured questionnaire as interview guide with mostly open-ended questions. The instrument benefited greatly from the one designed by Lynch (1999) for the same community. Oral interviews were tape-recorded and fully transcribed by me. The questions were designed to elicit narratives, such as stories about leaving Cuba, childhood experiences, opinions related to their lives as immigrants, etc. The average length of the recorded oral interviews was around 26 minutes. They usually took place at the participants' homes. The atmosphere was relaxed and the general tone and register of communication can be described as an informal interview style. The data selected for this study was largely obtained from responses to the following question:

Question 1 (Qu-1): In the United States there is a movement which proposes the official language of this country should be English. What is your opinion about it?

As mentioned before, the purpose of this question was to elicit language attitudes and beliefs participants had about the relationship between Spanish and English in their speech community.

7. Analysis

To contextualize the analysis and discussion that will follow, I quantified the support for EO among participants. Frequency count shows that a minority (25%) agreed with EO's proposal, whereas 71% somehow disagree: i.e., the 25% only represent categorical answers in favor of EO, the remaining 71% covers a gray area where endorsement and disapproval are inextricably combined.

⁵ The job scale consisted of the following categories: 0 (out of the labor market); 1 (laborers); 2 (customer service representatives, retail sellers); 3 (administrative workers); 4 (professionals and business owners.)

7.1. Stating the obvious: the invisibility of language (de)territorialization:

Earlier, I defined language (de)territorialization as a propositional act that validates (territorializes) one variety and by the same token delegitimizes (deterritorializes) another. I also mentioned that one of its characteristics was invisibility. Here I list several responses from my participants which support this claim. (Translations and transcription symbols are provided in Appendices 1 and 2):

- (1)
 - a. bueno la lengua oficial de aquí es el:: es el inglés pero en todah pahteh del mundo nadie te habla otro idioma (Isbelinda 3.XX) [well the official language here is English but nowhere else in the world will anyone talk to you in another language]
 - b. bueno yo en eso soy radical yo pienso que en ehtadoh unidoh a:: mm:: la lengua oficial debe ser el inglés porque siempre lo ha sido (Pepe 4.7: 241) [well in this case I'm a radical I think that in the United States uh::mm:: the official language should be English because it's always been so]

The premise in QU-1 conveys two main ideas: that English is *not* the official language of the U.S. but it *should be*. Isbelinda⁶ arrived in the U.S. after the age of 12, Pepe after he was 18. They understand and speak Spanish very well, and use it in their daily lives and with their family. Assuming they understood the question, I construe that their answers introduce a correction to the premise in order to state their core belief that "English is the official language of the United States." At first, these answers seemed awkward without further elaboration, at least in (1b). Later on, I was able to make sense of them, connecting them to the following beliefs:

- (2)
 - a. bueno yo creo que cada paísh tiene una lengua oficial como en cuba la lengua oficial eh el español y a mí me parece que cada persona debe hacer un por lo menoh un un:: ehfuerzo por hablar la lengua del paísh [...] em:: si tú vah a un lugar si tú vah a francia la lengua que predomina eh el francéh aunque los franceseh pueden hablar otrah lenguah puedan hablar inglésh puedan hablar ehpáñol lo mihmo en en inglaterra pues aquí la lengua oficial es el inglésh/ (Yuwja 4.39: 084). [well I think that each country has an official language like Cuba the official language is Spanish and I feel that every person should make a at least an effort to speak the language of the country [...] uh:: uh:: if you go somewhere if you go to France the predominant language is French although the French can speak other languages they can speak English/they can speak Spanish same in England/ well here the official language is English]
 - b. ¡correcto! el oficial debe ser el inglés o sea porque básicamente despúeh que fue la guerra contra los indios y dehpuéh que fue la guerra entre loh franceseh ¿quiéneh prevalecieron? ¿quiéneh tomaron el poder aquí? fueron loh ingleseh (Imelda 4.54: 091) [right the official should be English in other words because basically after the war against the Indians and after the war between the French who won? who came to power here? the British]
 - c. yo no sabía que no era el oficial pero [...] yo no sabía si eh el oficial bueno ehtá bien que cada paísh tenga su oficial (Gretchen 3.52: 082, 084) [I didn't know it wasn't the official/ [...] I didn't know if it is the official/ well/ it's ok for each country to have its own official]

I will not dwell on misconceptions in the texts; after all, participants are not, nor do they need to be, linguists. However, misconceptions like those expressed in 2a and 2b, tell us something about ideological constructions of the world beyond a specific speaker. In quote (2a), Yuwja explains the relationship between language and nation-states as she understands it. Her description resembles Maalki's (1992) position about how the world is imagined after the emergence of modern nation-states: "a discrete spatial partitioning of territory [...] territorialized in the segmentary fashion of the multicolored school atlas" (Malkki 1992: 26). In Yuwja's account, within nation-states, languages are (de)territorialized as official or not, which implies a hierachal order: there is *one* legitimate variety and *other* varieties. Furthermore, she uses two rhetorical devices, *universalization* and *naturalization*, frequently enmeshed in the ideological imagination, where the universal is also natural by implication (Eagleton 1994).

Thus, Yuwja's response conceives the world in the image and likeness of the post nation-state world map, where each territory is legitimately monolingual with its *official*⁷ language - and maybe there are other, lesser languages surrounding it.

⁶ All names are pseudonyms.

⁷ Notice that her description of official language can be something in between nationally extended language and a government privileged variety.

In our terms, the *territorialized, depoliticized* variety subordinates and politicizes all other varieties deterritorializing them, as immigrant languages, ethnic languages, market languages, tourist languages, L₂ languages taught in school, etc. However, Yuwja's description is not too farfetched vis-à-vis many people's folk beliefs. Such imagination is just the reproduction of the hegemonic ideology, and explains why EO, and monolingualism in general, becomes accepted as *the way the world is and works*.

- (3) a. bueno... yo creo que sí yo creo que la lengua ee:: debe de ser inglés' eh loh ehtadoh unidoh (Idalis 2.13)
[well I think so I think that the language uh:: should be English in the United States]
- b. yo estoy de acuerdo con eso pohque ehte eh el idioma de aquí/ igual si en cuba fueran ahora a decir "no, tienen que hablar ruso/ el idioma ofi oficial eh ruso" el idioma de aquí eh el inglés (Iberia 4.29: 103)
[right the official should be English in other words because basically after the war against the Indians and after the war between the French who won? who came to power here? the British]
- c. cuando yo llegué aquí no se inventó el inglés el inglés ya estaba inventao ya así que adonde tú te si tú vah a roma tieneh que hablar romano si vieneh aquí tieneh que hablar inglés (Nélida 3.59: 138)
[English wasn't invented when I got here it already existed so where you if you go to Rome you have to speak Roman if you come here you have to speak English]
- d. yo creo que yo ehtoy de acuehdo con eso que el inglés deba ser el el prime la primera lengua en loh ehtadoh unidoh ya que eh eh el inglés el que tú aprende' aquí cuando tú naceh (Merva 3.14: 083, 088)
[I think I agree with that that English should be the prim the primary language in the United States since it is English that you learn when you are born here]

Text (3a) represents the final state of the ideology of (de)territorialization: it is so tightly packed that has become a non-sequitur which goes unnoticed: To understand the connection between (A) "the language should be English" and (B) "because it is the United States" we need to generate several implicatures to bridge the ideological gap from (A) to (B). The fact that we automatically generate them indicates the invisibility of the (de)territorializing ideology⁸.

Invisibility is also indexed through the use of *aquí* (here) in quotes (3b-e). In (3b), "ehte eh el idioma de *aquí*", (this is the language here), one can ask what is the referent of *here*? Is it Miami or the U.S.? This ambiguity, unperceived by Iberia and others, illustrates again the entrenchment of language (de)territorialization at work, for we are unconsciously led to think in terms of the *nation-state* regardless factual contradictions. The truth is that there is no obvious answer to the question "what is the language *here*?" formulated in Miami (Carter and Lynch, 2015). On the one hand, all participants claim that the language of Miami is not only English. On the other, the majority of participants claims that Miami is a bilingual city, whereas the minority claims that it is Spanish.⁹ (Interestingly, I have never heard anybody claiming that *the* language of Miami is only English.) Contrary to what we might think, the minority opinion is the one voiced by EO supporters, because Miami has been derogatorily called a *third world* or *Latin American city* and non-derogatorily *the capital of or the gateway to Latin America*.

The same reasoning can be applied to Merva's use of *here* in (3d), when she claims that "eh el inglés el que tú aprende' *aquí* cuando tú naceh." Her statement contradicts the facts: all 17 participants born in the U.S. reported that Spanish was their first language and only later they became English dominant. Summarizing the analysis, we can conclude that the hegemonic imagination of the world as a space of nation-states, with their corresponding territorialized languages, is a powerful ideological sediment capable of outweighing the most obvious, immediate interpretation of the deictic *here* referring to the local community.

7.2. Language imposition: The narrative of Miami's Cuban takeover

Earlier, I referred to Miami's Cuban Takeover's narrative as one born in the Anglo-white and African American communities who resented the special treatment Cubans had received, as well as their demographic, political, and economic visibility in the Miami area.

⁸ I think that explains the perplexity I expressed at the beginning of this section, i.e., "[a]t first, these answers seemed awkward without further elaboration, at least in (1b)."

⁹ Interestingly, I have never heard anybody claiming that *the* language of Miami is only English.

However, in the following texts, we can see that this narrative is reproduced by Miami Cubans in the version of the Cuban's linguistic takeover:

- (4) a. bueno yo considero que sí uno debe hablar inglés si ehtáh en ehte paísh loh latinoh se creen que:: ee:: que la que la gente debe hablar ehpáñol para elloh [...] a mí me molehta cuando yo voy a un lugar y me empiezan a hablar en español sin saber si yo hablo ehpáñol o no so yo pienso que a loh americano' leh tiene que molehtar mucho máh (Cordelia 2.31: 063) [well I consider that yeah one should speak English if you're in this country Latinos think that uh:: that people should speak Spanish to them [...] it bothers me when I go somewhere and someone automatically speaks to me in Spanish without knowing if I speak Spanish or not so I imagine it has to bother Americans a lot more]
- b. bueno mi paísh Latina me dice que eh un poco dihcriminatoria [sic] pero mi mente americana me dice que poh qué no noh podemoh asimilar ¿entendeh? ¿por qué venir de otro paísh y tratar de venir a ehte paísh y cambiar la forma de ser de ehte paísh? a nohotroh no noh guhtaría que que fueran loh americano' a cuba y la convirtieran en otra américa (James 2.12: 186) [well my Latino half says that it's a little discriminatory but my American half asks me why can't we assimilate understand? why come to another country and try to come to this country and change how things are in this country? Cubans wouldn't like for Americans to go to Cuba and turn it into another America]
- c. de vechdá que a mí no me guhta metehme en lah dihcusione' y eso onque [aunque-JP] si yo tuviera mi opinión te dijera que aquí ehto eh américa ¿tú sa'e? y mientrah que ehtamoh aquí debemoh de hablar el lenguaje de de ehte lugar y bueno si ehtamo' en otro paísh debemo' aprender el otro lenguaje y ese eh el problema a mí me parece que afedta [sic-jp] mucho a lo' americano' que vengan loh latinoh la otra gente hablando siempre en lenguaje' (Augusto 2.48: 137) [Honestly I don't like to discuss this however if I had an opinion I'd tell you that this is America/ you know? and while we're here we should speak the local language and if we're in another country we should learn the other language and that's the problem I think it bothers Americans that Latinos arrive the other people always speaking in languages]

First of all, I disagree with Cordelia's claim that people get annoyed for being addressed in a foreign language. I think if the variety was, say, Italian, her answer would have been "I don't speak Italian" without getting annoyed. Thus, her attitude unveils the evaluation of the two varieties in the speech community. Second, I think we need to factor in a certain doses of self-hatred in order to explain her reaction, since Cordelia is highly proficient in Spanish but gets uncomfortable when she is addressed in the language. Is it because it bothers her to be identified as Hispanic? James, though, seems to perceive the contradiction when he claims that his American part discriminates a little against his Latino part. However, his conclusion "a nohotroh no noh guhtaría que que fueran loh americano' a cuba/ y la convirtieran en otra américa"¹⁰ is not supported by facts. But my interest in those quotes is that all three participants contribute to the narrative that Hispanics are illegitimately imposing their language onto Americans.

In my experience in Miami, when someone, except the elderly, does not speak in English to a monolingual Anglo, it is because s/he has recently arrived and has not had the time to learn the basics of English. That situation rarely ends up in a total communication breakdown because there are always bilinguals around ready to help. For example:

- (5) en ehtoh díah yo yo fui a un a un subway y había una muchacha argentina era por cierto ee:: que ehtaba en en la caja cobrando y no sabía inglés no sabía inglés o sea el ameri americano se le paró delante y le hizo doh o treh preguntah y ella lo miraba como "ehtoy perdida" but but pero habían otras personas allí que sí hablaban inglés ¿no? pero yo me pregunto si no habrá lugare' donde o a lo mejor la respuehta eh "no no es no eh totalmente bilingüe" (Medea 2.37: 266) [a few days I went to a to a subway and there was a girl really Argentinean uh:: and she was working the register and she didn't know English didn't know English in other words the Ameri the American got to the register and asked her two or three questions and she was looking at him like "I'm lost" but but but there were other people there who did speak English right? but I wonder if there are places where or maybe the answer is it's not completely bilingual]

¹⁰ It is well known Cuba was highly Americanized before Castro's regime in 1959 and the use of English was a mark of status among middle and upper classes (Pérez 1999).

With this anecdote, Medea is answering to a different question about whether or not Miami is a truly bilingual city. The type of communication breakdown portrayed in (5) is normal for anyone who has just arrived in a new language community. S/he needs time to learn the new variety, although in the meantime, they need to work to eat.

The linguistic takeover of Miami by Hispanics is a false narrative. Miami fits the profile of a bilingual community where there are monolinguals and bilinguals, and usually in this arrangement, as Appel and Muysken (1987: 2) claim, bilinguals are "a minority group [...] in the sociological sense [...] [of-JP] non-dominant or oppressed group." There is always a vast supply of minority brokers to mediate between monolinguals. Can we call this type of situation a linguistic takeover when Hispanics are the ones acting as language *brokers*?

There is, though, another type of situation frequently described in the interviews, which tells a different story about language imposition:

- (6) a. una situación típica bueno por ejemplo te voy a poner una situación mía específica e:: yo estaba en un banco una vez aquí cerca de la casa ee:: la teler me estaba hablando en:: la cajera me estaba hablando en español la señora que estaba detrás de mí no hablaba español se ofendió y me insultó claro el insulto lo recibió después de ella porque yo a modo jocoso le pregunté si ella hablaba español/ ella me dijo que no que no tenía por qué y entonces como yo le dije que si ella estaba en español tenía que hablar si ella estaba en mayami tenía que hablar español porque esta era la segunda ciudad más poblada de cuba pues la señora se insultó se indignó y me dijo todo lo que se le ocurrió pero eso me pareció un poco absurdo ¿no? yo lo tomé por la parte de de folclórica de divertirme ella lo tomó por la parte agresiva pero eso es un caso independiente (Pepe 4.7: 441) [a typical situation well for example I'm going to tell you about something that specifically happened to me one time I was in a bank near my house uh::the teller was talking to me in:: the teller was talking to me in Spanish the woman in line behind me didn't speak Spanish she became offended and insulted me but I got her back after she because I joking around asked her if she spoke Spanish she told me no that she didn't have to and since I told her that since she was in Spanish she had to speak since she was in Miami she had to speak Spanish because this is the second most populous Cuban city/ well, she felt insulted and was outraged and told me everything she could think of but I felt that was kind of absurd no? I took it as folkloric amusing she took it the wrong way and got aggressive but that's a different story]
- b. si por ejemplo de:: eh:: yo he ehtado por ejemplo en en la puerta de un hotel en *west palm beach* con mi ehposa que ehtaba tomando un cuhso y eh:: ehtábamoh en el loby del del hotel y ehtábamoh conversando en ehpañol pasó u::una pareja de de nohteamericanoh obviamente sureño eh:: y noh dijeron así literalmente a la cara "fuck you" (Odilio 4.36: 188) [yeah for example uh:: uh:: I have been for example at at a hotel entrance in West Palm Beach with my wife who was taking a course and uh:: we were in the lobby of the the hotel and we were chatting in Spanish a:: an American couple passed by obviously from the South uh:: and told us literally to our faces "fuck you"]

Another example comes from a journalist:

I was walking quietly with my wife on a sidewalk in Miami Beach. We were speaking Spanish, of course, because that is our language. Suddenly, we were accosted by a spry little old lady, wearing a baseball cap and sneakers, who told us: 'Talk English. You are in the United States.' She continued on her way at once, without stopping to see our reaction. The expression on her face, curiously, was not that of somebody performing a rude action, but of somebody performing a sacred patriotic duty (Montaner 1992: 163)

This type of language imposition is common in Miami, but this situation seems to be different from the one in (5) because there is no communication breakdown. In (6a, b, c), the eavesdropper is not affected or involved in the exchange. They just want to manifest displeasure as dominant group by reterritorializing English and deterritorializing Spanish.

7.3. Modality in discourses (de)territorializing languages:

The second feature of (de)territorialization was the recurrence of deontic modality. Deontic modality underlies the logic of obligation and permission, and modal logic uses a heuristic devise, the theory of possible worlds, to account for its semantics.

Deontic and assertive modalities differ in the type of relationship they establish with the represented world. This is usually explained through the imagery of *direction* from words to world or vice versa. Well-formed assertions must represent whatever the case is in a given possible world. They are bound to reflect or correspond to a certain state of affairs in the real or any other possible world. An assertion such as "...And Master Fox told the raven as he walked off 'Though it is cracked, you have a voice sure enough. But where are your wits?'" (Aesop n.d.), represents a possible world in which foxes and birds verbally communicate, and it is true in Aesop's fables.

In terms of *direction*, assertions move from world to words: a way of saying that words must adjust to fit the world. On the contrary, deontic speech acts¹¹ create a tension between words and world, demanding or denouncing the necessity of a change in the opposite direction: the world *must* change to fit the words. Therefore, the direction goes from words to world. For example, in (7b), Merva is urging some indeterminate *you* to change his/her behavior and act as he/she *should* (in (7) deontics auxiliary are in bold):

- (7) a. si estamos en los Estados Unidos y el lenguaje es el inglés sí **debería** ser el lenguaje del país (Tagmara 2.65: 116) [if we are in the United States and the language is English yes it should be the country's language]
- b. pues sí yo yo estoy de acuerdo con eso el país en el que tú estás **debes** aprender la lengua que ellos hablan (Minerva 3.15: 88) [well yeah I I agree with that the country you're in you should learn the language they speak]
- c. bueno yo pienso que sí uno **debería** hablar inglés si estás en este país (Ceferina . . 1.31: 63) [well I think so one should speak English if you're in this country]
- d. bueno yo estoy de acuerdo con eso si tú vives en los Estados Unidos tú **tienes que** hablar inglés (Zelsa 1.40: 84) [well I agree with that if you live in the United States you have to speak English]
- e. yo te diría que ehto eh América ¿tu sa'e? y mientra' estemo' aquí **deberíamo'** aprender a hablar el lenguaje de de ehte lugar si nosotro' estamo' en otro país nosotro' **deberíamo'** aprender el otro lenguaje (Augusto 2.48: 137) [I'd say to you that this is America you know? and while we're here we should learn to speak the language here if we were in another country we should learn the other language]

The use of deontic verbs triggers the representation of alternative worlds: the utterances in (7) explicitly recognize at least two possible worlds –one *de jure*, one *de facto* – and the direction goes from *de jure* => *de facto*. When these texts convey that "if you are here you **must** learn/speak English", they depict a *de facto* situation – in which people don't know/learn/speak English – as a disturbance of language predictability and call for the reinstatement of a *de jure* state, the unstated language policy, where everyone in the U.S. must know/learn/speak English. By using deontics to frame the languages' relationship – this language should, this other should not – participants reveal the perception of a broken predictability by a *de facto* situation, which should be reversed to their previous *de jure* status quo.

If deontic utterances convey obligation and permission, persuasive and/or coercive mechanisms should be in place in order generate acquiescence or compliance. Thus, it can be insightful to look how participants rationalize this deontic force.

In order to perform a directive speech act, certain preconditions need to be met:

- i) the speaker sincerely wants the addressee(s)¹² to do *p*
- ii) it is within the power of the addressee to do *p*, and
- iii) there is some benefit – or reduction of harm – for the addressee to do *p* (Searle 1991b; 1986)

Conditions (i) *sincerity* and (ii) *capability* are logical preconditions. However, condition (iii) leads us to inquire into the *motivational factor*: why do we consent or comply, follow orders, accept impositions, etc.? Deontic utterances gather *persuasive* strength from a variety of sources, which usually work together as part and parcel of an institutionalized system of social compliance.

¹¹ I mean to say speech acts with deontic verbs.

¹² The addressee is the real target of a message; the subject whose attitude or behavior the speaker wants to affect. Therefore, it can coincide or not with the physical interlocutor (hearer/reader).

Three are the main sources behind that persuasive strength: physical submission, social pressures and, complementing the first two, material and symbolic retributions – which Fishman (1985) calls the institutionalized system of social rewards. Quite often, all three mechanisms of social compliance are disguised under an axiological code, threaded into the social fabric by the work of ideology. The statements presented in

(8), illustrate this point:

- (8) a. bueno yo creo que sí que en ehte ehtado que aquí nosotroh vinimoh y que tenemoh que darleh gracia mileh a un paíh que noh ha ja noh ha abierto la' puerta' que noh ha pehmitido desarrollarnoh pohque a mí por ejemplo yo me ha permitido desarrollarme yo vine a la edá' de empezar a desarrollarme ¿okey? me ha permitido desarrollarme y me ha permitido que yo tengo por lo menos me siento felíh con lo que tengo mm:: tengo ehte apahtamentico que me falta muy poco por terminarlo de pagar mi carrito y no puedo dejarle económicamente nada a mi hijo pero sí he ehtado siempre y empujando para que ehtudie entonce lo único que puedo hacer eh dejarle una carrera me lo ha permitido si hubiera vivido en otro lugar no podría haber sido así entonceh *english* sí (Nélida 3.59: 138) [well I think so that in this state that we live in that we have to be very thankful that this country has has opened its doors that has allowed us to better ourselves because me for example me it has allowed me to better myself I came around puberty okay? it has allowed me to better myself and it has allowed me to have at least I feel happy with what I have mm:: I have this small apartment which will be paid off soon mi little car and I can't leave any money to my son but I've always pushed him to study so the only thing can leave him is a career it has allowed me to do that if I lived somewhere else it wouldn't be like that so English yes]
- b. ee:: yo creo que:: a veces:: ee:: aunque este país noh ha abierto mucho las puertah y noh ha dado lo que ni creo que ningún otro país nos hubiera dado de llegar aquí sin ningún idioma y:: podehnos desarrollar (Esperanza 4.1: 128) [uh:: I think that sometimes uh:: even though this country has opened doors and has given us what I think no other country would've given us to arrive here without any language and:: allowed us to better ourselves]
- c. bueno ee:: esa pregunta es un poco ¿cómo te pudiera decir? ee:: y:: yo creo que cuando tú vives en los estados unidoh y tienes la oportunidad que este país te:: por lo menoh a nosotros que no noh han querido en nuestro paíh te da la oportunidá de vivir de ser una persona de vivir decentemente de:: de:: de ser un benefactor de tu propio trabajo ee:: yo yo creo que si tú vives en lo estados unidos debes y tienes que hablar inglés [xxxx] un idioma el idioma oficial por ante durante muchos añoh en este país (Jerónimo 4.9: 186) [well uh:: that question is a little how can I say it uh:: and:: I think that when you live in the United States and you have the opportunities that this country:: at least for us who were unwanted in our own country it gives you the opportunity to live to be a person to live decently to:: to :: to be the owner of your own business uh:: I I think that if you live in the United States you should and have to speak English [xxxx] a language the official language before for many years in this country]
- d. bueno en primero yo lo que pienso e' [es-JP] lo siguiente como lo' americano' dicen *in rome do that the romans do* si uhté viene aquí buhcando libertá que no lo puede consegui en su lugal yo creo que debe aprendel lo que donde uhté 'htá ¿tú me entiende'? [...] si tú vieneh a un lugal vamo a suponel yo te soy entrada a mi casa tú tiene que compoltahte bien entoce' si yo te 'htoy dando entrada en un lugal que po lo meno tú puedes salil a trabajal y podel echal para 'lante pa su familia yo creo que le deben dal un poquito de:: ¿tú me entiende'? un poco de alivio ¿uhté me entiende? yo entiendo totalmente que cuando lo' cubano' vinieron pol camarioca en el sesenta y viniero pol mariel en el ochenta ¿okey? cuando en el seseta vinieron pol el camarioca mayami no era nada (Rock 1.44: 105) [well uh:: that question is a little how can I say it? uh:: and:: I think that when you live in the united states and you have the opportunities that this country:: at least for us who were unwanted in our own country it gives you the opportunity to live to be a person to live decently to:: to :: to be the owner of your own business uh:: I I think that if you live in the united states you should and have to speak english [xxxx] a language the official language before for many years in this country]

Three main observations can be made about the previous quotes. First, they identify the *benefit/avoidance of harm* in relation to access to material or symbolic rewards. Second, the motivation for social compliance and conformity is normally disguised, perhaps dignified, with an axiology of due retribution based on gratitude and respect.

Finally, we can see how the Golden Exiles' narrative has become a source of moral pressure: the system of rewards and privileges implemented by the state has succeeded in making these participants to feel morally obliged to honor the territorialized language. Indeed, their axiological discourse of due retribution and model citizens does not take into account that the reward system is part and parcel of the system of language enforcement. More crucially, the institutionalization of punishments and rewards is not part of a language planning project concerned with the communicative needs of the local community, but an investment of the state apparatus policy, which aims at the preservation of power hierarchies and privileges, being apparently eroded by the increasing number of immigrants. The following narratives open a window to that aspect of the language policy: they show how the value of Spanish is kept hidden, whereas the status of English is underscored by its use as the gatekeeper to access to jobs:

- (9) a. cuando tú entrab a un trabajo/ yo cuando empecé a trabajar aquí lah doh trabajoh que he tenido lah entrevihtah y todo funciona en inglés y dehpueh no hablah máh inglés una vez en el otro trabajo que yo tenía que era en un banco y yo trabajaba en la plataforma directamente con público em empezó enero y dije "voy a contar loh americanoh que lleguen aquí" y creo que llegaron doh al año y puedo decir hahta loh nombre' [...] entonceh ¿tú sa'e? ¿qué sentido tiene que te hagan una entrevihta? claro la entrevihta tiene que ser toda en inglés y toda en inglés (Drexis 4.47: 88, 93) [when you start a job when I started working here both jobs I've had the interview and everything is in English and then we don't speak any more English one time in the other job I had which was in a bank and I worked on the platform directly with the customers at the beginning of January I said "I'm going to count the number of Americans that come here" and I think we only had two per year and I can even say their names [...] so you know? what's the point of the interview? of course the interview has to be all in English all in English]
- b. em:: sí eh:: noh pasó a nosotroh cuando yo trabajaba en un banco se llamaba [xxx] bank el banco fue comprado por otro banco cuando esa veg eh:: persona o sea el personal nuevo entró en el banco muchoh de loh que trabajábamos allí noh era más fácil el hablar el ehpaiñol y:: también por local por la localidad en que estábamoh todo el mundo hablaba ehpaiñol y eso a elloh le' molehtaba como eran americanoh decían eh noh noh dijeron en una ocasión que no podíamoh hablal en ehpaiñol noh lo dijeron pero nosotroh noh reviramoh y nosotroh dijimoh que nosotroh lo sentíamoh pero que loh clienteh que iban ahí todoh hablaban ehpaiñol ninguno hablaba en inglés y que eso no noh iba a dejar o sea que por elloh no querer que nosotroh no habláramoh en ehpaiñol ee:: nosotroh no íbamoh a dejar de sehvir ah cliente que ehtaban o sea que ehtaban equivocadoh o sea que nosotroh no íbamoh a dejar de hablar en ehpaiñol 'tonce lo que noh dijeron fue que entones cada veh que un cliente entrara que le preguntáramos en español primero en inglés primero si no sabía en inglés que entonceh le hablaramoh en ehpaiñol (MS 2.10: 119) [mm: yes uh:: it happened to us when I worked in a bank it was [XXX] bank the bank was bought by another bank when that uh:: person I mean the new staff started working at the bank for a lot of that worked there it was easier for us to speak in Spanish/ and :: also because of the loca the location where we were everybody spoke Spanish and that bothered them because they were American they said uh:: they told us once that we couldn't speak Spanish they told us that but we rebelled and we said that we were sorry but the clients that went to the bank all spoke Spanish none of them spoke English and that that wouldn't allow us I mean their not wanting us to speak Spanish wasn't going to stop us from helping the clients they were I mean they were wrong I mean we weren't going to stop speaking Spanish so they told us that every time that a client came in we had to ask them in Spanish first in English first if they didn't know English then we could speak to them in Spanish]

c. hace muchos año yo era service representative ehtamoh hablando del año setentaidó' y ee:: el jefe decidió prohibirnoh hablar ehpaoñol entre nosotrah ¿no? noh prohibió hablar ehpaoñol lo que pasó fue que nosotrah entre otrah cosah hacíamoh colecciones de cuentah que ehtaban atrasadah y muchoh de loh clienteh a que llamábamoh cuando loh llamabah para m:: para decirle que tenían que pagar la cuenta de teléfono nos decían "ah:: yo no hablo ingléh, no entiendo" "I'm sorry, no s no speak english" y nosotroh decíamo "ah perdón pueh nosotro no hablamo' en ehpaoñol" y le colgábamoh y la:: y aquello mira lah lah lah pilah de de aquellos papeles se iban amontonando y amontonando y to'oh decían "el cliente no habla ingléh" "el cliente no habla ingléh" eso duró menoh de treh díah cuando el jefe vio que no se podía' colectar lah cuentah atrasadah pohque nadie hablaba ehpaoñol y le dijimoh "si no hablamoh en ehpaoñol aquí ni con loh clienteh tampoco" eso duró treh díah (Medea 2.37: 12) [a long time ago I was a service representative we're talking nineteen seventy-two and uh:: the boss decided to prohibit us from speaking Spanish amongst ourselves right? prohibited us from speaking Spanish what happened was that we among other things we collected on past due accounts and a lot of the customers that we called when we called them to m:: to tell them that they needed to pay their phone bill they would tell us uh::" I don't speak English" I don't understand I'm sorry, no sss no speak English and we would say uh sorry we don't speak Spanish and we' hang up and the :: and that look the the piles of papers was getting bigger and bigger they all said "the customer doesn't speak English" "the customer doesn't speak English" that last less than three days when the boss saw that we couldn't collect on the past due bills because nobody spoke Spanish and we told him "if we can't speak Spanish here amongst ourselves then we won't speak Spanish with the customers either that lasted three days]

The previous narratives unveil the value of Spanish in the labor market along with the implementation of a top-down system, enforcing Spanish deterritorialization from institutional levels, all the way down to middle management, coworkers, to street vigilantes. They all help to implement and support a system of social compliance and conformity, consisting of overt and covert rewards and punishments. Covert mechanisms are introduced as necessary for labor market requirements: although most jobs in Miami need bilingual skills, the English language is the gatekeeper for job accessibility, a system which only recognizes the value of English monolingualism as entry requirement (see 9a). That serves two purposes: on the one hand, it represents a business strategy of cost-reduction: by not recognizing the need of Spanish, the employer is not required to pay for bilingual skills.¹³ On the other hand, it reinforces social mechanisms of hierarchy, prestige, and control – i.e., the delegitimation of Spanish, by ignoring its value in the work domain. Overt strategies of social enforcement, such as language proscription are used at work or on the streets, only when Spanish is not instrumentally used for the benefit of the productive system or, doesn't serve English monolingual's immediate needs.

8. Final remarks

This paper introduced the concept of *language (de)territorialization*, a tool developed to unravel the ideological source and meaning of a number of propositions in support of the EO policy. This support is more surprising, since these language attitudes are upheld in the vibrant bilingual speech community of South Florida, where Spanish proficiency is a valued instrumental skill in everyday life. I consider such manifestations of support an instance of Marx's *false consciousness* –the voluntary adoption of a subjugating discourse by the subjugated.

I identified two recurrent characteristics present in language (de)territorialization:

invisibility and *deontic modality*. These two features are revealed through the analysis of linguistic elements present in the texts. I also have mentioned different narratives, the *Golden Exiles* and *Miami's Cuban Takeover*, *the old Cubans versus the new Cubans* circulating in the Cuban-American community and other ethnic groups (including Anglo-whites) in the Miami-Dade speech community. These narratives are linked to negative language attitudes and beliefs in the Cuban and the wider community. The devaluation of Spanish is a constant in that community: proscribed, looked down upon, even scorned in some institutional settings and public domains, and patriotically guarded by street vigilantes repeating their favorite *non sequitur* "Speak English, you are in the United States."

¹³ This issue is vaguely perceived by few participants. They perceive they realize their bilingual skills are used to the advantage of their employer, although they receive no compensation for them.

Appendix 1: Symbols used in transcriptions

- «a::»: «a» represents a consonant or vowel, and «::» indicates the lengthening on that sound
- «ee::»: equivalent to English filler «uh» sometimes it is pronounced closer to the timber of a vowel [a], rarely [u]
- «[...]»: a non-relevant portion of the text that has been suppressed
- «[¿...?]» text produced with intonation of question
- «[sic]»: used to indicate that the text is highly ungrammatical, and it is not a typing error. Mistakes that can be repaired by the reader go unmarked
- «"..."» for direct quotations
- «'...'» for quotations within quotations
- «'»: at the beginning, middle or end of words indicates a missing sound or syllable, for example: ¿tú sa'e'? versus ¿tú sabes?
- «h»: aspirated sound, typically used as an allophone of consonants at the end of syllables/words. Most of the time it is an allophone of the phoneme /s/ (alveolar voiceless consonant) but also substitutes other sounds in coda.
- «[xxx]»: incomprehensible portion of text; also used to indicate a name that doesn't need to be disclosed.

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